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Eﬃcient Subversion of Symmetric Encryption with Random
Initialization Vector
Joonsang BAEK†a) , Nonmember and Ilsun YOU††b) , Member

SUMMARY
This paper presents an eﬃcient subverted symmetric encryption scheme, which outputs a random initialization vector (IV). Compared with the available scheme of the same kind in the literature, our attack
provides a saboteur (big brother) with much faster recovery of a key used in
a victim’s symmetric encryption scheme. Our result implies that care must
be taken when a symmetric encryption scheme with a random IV such as
randomized CBC is deployed.
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1.

Introduction

Motivation. Since Edward Snowden revealed that the US
and UK governments made a great deal of eﬀort to subvert widely deployed cryptographic systems [4], algorithm
substitution attack (ASA) [1] on cryptographic schemes has
been being actively explored [2], [3], [5]. ASA, proposed by
Bellare, Paterson and Rogaway (BPR), refers to an activity
whereby a saboteur [5] (or a big brother [1], [6]) replaces
an original implementation of a cryptographic scheme with
a subverted one. This subverted scheme can leak partial or
entire information about the secret key or message.
Note that the notion of ASA is very similar to that of
“kleptographic” attack in the early literature [6]. Note also
that Degabriele, Farshim and Poettering recently refined and
improved BPR’s security notions related to ASA [3].
In this paper, we focus on BPR’s IV-replacement attack whereby a random IV, which is present as a ciphertext component of a symmetric encryption scheme such as
randomized CBC, is replaced by a concocted IV that will
make it possible for a saboteur to recover the key used in the
symmetric encryption scheme. More precisely, the saboteur replaces the victim’s symmetric encryption algorithm
with a malicious one that outputs a ciphertext to encrypt the
victim’s secret key under his subversion key using a symmetric encryption scheme of his choice. This ciphertext is
disguised as a random IV of the victim’s symmetric encryption scheme. By decrypting the ciphertext disguised as the
random IV with his subversion key, the saboteur will be able
to obtain the victim’s secret key and be in full control of the
cryptosystem.
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However, there are some technical diﬃculties in realizing IV-replacement attack, which were not addressed fully
in BPR’s work [1]. That is, the saboteur needs to maintain
a state, which is to “remember” one particular subverted ciphertext that contains disguised IV that encrypts the victim’s
symmetric key. Since maintaining such a state (remembering one ciphertext among many) is not always practical, if
not impossible. BPR also proposed the “stateless” subverted
scheme in which the saboteur does not need to maintain
a state. However, the problem of this approach is that the
saboteur needs to collect more than 896 ciphertexts (if 128bit key is used) to recover the victim’s key. Our aim is to
revisit BPR’s subverted symmetric encryption scheme and
improve its eﬃciency.
Our Contributions. We show that the aforementioned IVreplacement attack can be performed very eﬃciently, more
eﬃciently than those presented in BPR’s paper [1]. The
idea behind our improvement is that we propose a “semistateful” subversion technique that every one of two consecutive ciphertexts contains subliminal information that can
lead to the leakage of a victim’s key. Basically, our attack is stateful but in our improved attack, the saboteur does
not need to “remember” one particular ciphertext unlike the
stateful attack presented by BPR neither does he need to
collect as many as (at least) 896 ciphertexts, which is necessary in BPR’s stateless attack [1]. Our attack requires the
saboteur to have at most two to six ciphertexts to perform
subversion sucessfully.
2.

Preliminaries

In this section, we review several basic notions that will
be used throughout this paper. First, we review the formal
definitions of a symmetric encryption scheme, followed by
pseudorandom function.
Definition 1: Let (G, E, D) be a symmetric encryption
scheme. The key generation algorithm G takes 1n (n denotes the security parameter) as input and outputs a key
k. Taking a key k and a message m as input, the encryption algorithm generates a ciphertext c. We denote this operation by c ← E(k, m). Taking a key k, and a ciphertext as input, the decryption algorithm outputs a message
pair m or ⊥ (reject symbol). We denote this operation by
m ( or ⊥) ← D(k, c, s).
Definition 2: Let F : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a lengthpreserving keyed function. F is a pseudorandom function if
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for all probabilistic polynomial-time distinguishers
D, there

 Pr[DF(k,·) (1n ) =
exists a negligible function
(n)
such
that

1] − Pr[D f (·) (1n ) = 1] ≤ (n), where the first probability is
taken over uniform choice of k and the randomness used in
D, and the second probability is taken over uniform choice
of f from the set of all functions mapping n-bit strings to
n-bit strings and the randomness used in D.
Now, we review the definition of a subverted symmetric encryption scheme [1], which is based on the generic
symmetric encryption scheme defined in Definition 1.
Definition 3: Let (G, E, D) be a symmetric encryption
scheme. Let (G, E, D) be a subverted symmetric encryption
scheme. The subversion key generation algorithm G takes
1n (n denotes the security parameter) as input and outputs a
subversion key k̃. Taking a subversion key k̃, a key k generated by G, a message m and a state σ as input, the encryption
algorithm generates a subverted ciphertext c and a new state
σ . We denote this operation by (c, σ ) ← E(k̃, k, m, σ).
Taking a subversion key k̃ and a key k generated by G, a
ciphertext c and a state σ as input, the decryption algorithm
outputs a message/state pair (m, σ ) or ⊥ (reject). We denote
this operation by (m, σ )( or ⊥) ← D(k̃, k, c, σ).
Note that in the above definition, the subverted symmetric encryption scheme is defined as stateful in general,
i.e., either of σ and σ is non-empty string. If both σ and
σ are empty strings in both encryption and decryption algorithms, the scheme is stateless.
Intuitively, a basic security requirement for the subverted symmetric encryption scheme from the point of the
saboteur would be that a ciphertext generated from the subverted scheme is not distinguishable from the one generated
from the regular symmetric encryption scheme. The following definition called “undetectability” captures this intuition [1].
Definition 4: Let (G, E, D) be a subverted symmetric encryption scheme. Let A be an adversary. Consider the following game DetectA (n):
1. A uniform subversion key k̃ is generated by G.
2. A uniform bit b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen.
3. A is given oracle access to KEY(·) and Enc(·), which
are described as follows.
• KEY(·): On input i, this oracle returns a uniform
key ki generated by G. (Note that i is an identity
associated with a key k.)
• Enc(·, ·): On input (i, m), this oracle computes
(c, σi ) ← E(k̃, ki , m, σi ) and returns c if b = 0
and returns c ← E(ki , m) otherwise.
4. A returns its guess b .
5. The game outputs 1 if b = b, and 0 otherwise.
The subverted encryption scheme is said to be undetectable if there exists a negligible function (n) such that
Pr[DetectA (n)] ≤ 12 + (n).

3.

The Proposed Subverted Symmetric Encryption
Scheme

We now describe our subverted symmetric encryption
scheme (G, E, D), which is to conduct IV-replacement attack. Let (G, E, D) be a symmetric encryption scheme
with security parameter n ∈ Z+ . We assume that the
scheme (G, E, D) is stateless and “surfaces” IV, meaning
that IV is explicitly present as one of input parameters and
there exists an algorithm S that eﬃciently recovers IV, i.e.
S(E(k, m, IV)) = IV. Let E be an encryption algorithm of
a block cipher whose key, input and output lengths are the
same as n. We assume that |IV| = n for the sake of simplicity (as done in [1]) and that j ∈ Z+ ∪ {0} is a global counter,
initialized to 0. We also assume that a state σ is initialized to
NULL (a null string). The description of each sub-algorithms
is as follows.




• k̃ ← G(1n ): On input 1n such that n = n, G chooses a
uniform k̃ ∈ {0, 1}n .
• (c j , σ) ← E(k̃, k, m, σ): On input a subversion key k̃
and a key k of E, both of which are selected at random,
a counter j, a message m and a state σ, E works as
follows.
If j = 0 mod 2, do the following:
Choose a uniform IV j ∈ {0, 1}n .
Compute c j ← E(k, m, IV j ).
Set τ ← IV j .
Return c j .
If j = 1 mod 2, do the following:
Set ι ← k ⊕ τ.
Compute IV j ← E(k̃, ι).
Compute c j ← E(k, m, IV j ).
Return c j .
Set j ← j + 1 and σ ← ( j, τ).
• D(k̃, cl , cl+1 ) for some l ∈ Z+ ∪ {0}: On input a subversion key k̃, two consecutive ciphertexts cl and cl+1 ,
D recovers IVl and IVl+1 from cl and cl+1 respectively,
computes ι ← E −1 (k̃, IVl+1 ) and k ← ι⊕IVl and outputs
D(k, cl+1 ).
Note in the algorithm E that the j-th random IV j , where
j = 0 mod 2, is XORed with the subversion key k̃ and is
provided as input to the block cipher E. This procedure essentially randomizes E. Note also that while the underlying encryption scheme (G, E, D) is stateless, its subversion
(G, E, D) is stateful. However, diﬀerent from the stateful
subverted scheme presented in [1], our scheme does not require the saboteur to get one particular subverted ciphertext
to recover the symmetric key k. (Obtaining the first subverted ciphertext can be diﬃcult in practice due to an transmission error, delay, loss and etc.) Again, diﬀerent from the
stateless subverted symmetric scheme presented in [1], ours
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IV j ∈ {0, 1}|IV| (n = |IV|) and set τ ← IV j .
Compute c j ← E(ki , m, IV j ) and return c j .

does not require the saboteur to collect as many as 896 subverted ciphertexts, which is equivalent to the size of 128-bit
symmetric key multiplied by the log value of it. In our subverted scheme, the saboteur needs only a small number of
consecutive subverted ciphertexts to recover the key of the
underlying symmetric scheme, as shown below.
Theorem 1: Assume that pairs of consecutitve ciphertexts
are selected at random by a saboteur. Then the decryption
algorithm D will decrypt a ciphertext correctly with probability 1 − (1/2)t , where t denotes the number of pairs of
ciphertexts.
Proof 1: For a given pair of consecutive subverted ciphertexts, depending on whether the first of them is j-th ciphertext such that j mod 2 = 0 or not, the saboteur can succeed in decrypting them. This happens with probability 1/2
assuming that a pair of ciphertexts is selected at random.
When decryption fails, the saboteur picks another pair of
consecutive ciphertexts at random independently and tries
to decrypt them. This process continues until the saboteur
decrypt a pair of ciphertexts correctly. Note that at each
trial (of selecting a pair of ciphertexts), the saboteur’s success probability follows geometric distribution. Hence, the
probability that less than or equal to t trials (t ≥ 1) are necessary for the saboteur to succeed is (1 − 1/2)0 (1/2) + (1 −
1/2)1 (1/2)+· · ·+(1−1/2)t−1 (1/2) = 1−(1−1/2)t = 1−(1/2)t .
Note that even for small t, the saboteur can successfully decrypt the pair of consecutive subverted ciphertexts
and hence obtain the key for the scheme (G, E, D) with a
high probability. Thus, we call our scheme “semi-stateful”
meaning it is essentially stateful but it is quite close to stateless scheme, which only needs the small number of subverted ciphertexts to perform IV-replacement attack.
3.1

Security Analysis

In this section, we show that our subverted symmetric
scheme presented in the previous section satisfies the undetectability property (Definition 4).
Theorem 2: Assuming that the block cipher E is a pseudorandom function, our subverted symmetric encryption
scheme is undetectable.
Proof 2: Let A be an adversary of the undetectability game
for the scheme (G, E, D). We construct an adversary D for
pseudorandom function E(k̃, ·) that uses A as a subroutine
as follows.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Choose a uniform key ki ∈ {0, 1}n .
Set j ← 0, τ ← ⊥ and σ ← ( j, τ).
Choose a bit b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
On receiving (i, m) from A (i is a key identity), do the
following:
Parse σ as ( j, τ).
If b = 0, do the following:
If τ  ⊥, set IV j ← τ. Else pick a uniform

Else query τ⊕ki to its oracle to get IV j ← O(τ⊕ki ),
compute c j ← E(ki , m, IV j ) and return c j .
Set j ← j + 1.
5. Continue answering A’s queries until A returns its
guess b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = b return 1.
We first show that Pr[DE(k̃,·) (1n ) = 1] =
Detect
(n) = 1]: Note that when O(·) = E(k̃, ·), D
Pr[GameA
perfectly simulates A’s environment including the interaction between A and the encryption oracle. (Note that IV’s
are created alternatively by choosing a uniform string of appropriate length and by encrypting the previous random IV
XORed with the symmetric key ki in this case.)
However, when O(·) = e(·), where e is a function chosen uniformly at random from the family of functions mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings (denoted e ← Randn ), each
of ciphertexts that A receives from the encryption oracle is
identically distributed. (Their IV’s are all uniform random.)
Hence, D does not get any advantage through A in distinguishing subverted ciphertexts from original ones. Thus,
 Pr
E(k̃,·) n
(1 ) =
Pr[De (1n ) = 1] = 12 . Then, we
k̃←{0,1}n [D
 have

Detect
e(·) n
1] − Pre←Randn [D (1 ) = 1] =  Pr[GameA (n) = 1] − 12 .

 Prk̃←{0,1}n [DE(k̃,·) (1n ) = 1]−Pre←Randn [De(·) (1n ) =
Since

Detect
(n) = 1] ≤
1] ≤ (n) by assumption, we have Pr[GameA
1
+
(n).
2
4.

Concluding Remarks

Our result shows that subversion on symmetric encryption
schemes with random IV can be performed very eﬃciently.
Hence, care must be taken to implement and deploy such
schemes as a form of software. It is imperative that proper
verification and validation of this kind of software be conducted.
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